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follows: "Proceedings under this Act to establish the paternity of such
child may be instituted at any time within three years next after the
birth of the child, and not thereafter: Provided, however, that where
the reputed father has acknowledged the paternity of the child by pay-
ments for the support of such child within three years from the date
of birth thereof, and not later, then, in such case, prosecution may be
brought under the provisions of said sections within three years from
the date of such acknowledgment of the paternity of such child by the
reputed father thereof." In the first case calling for a construction of
the amendment the defendant was charged with willful neglect and re-
fusal to support his illegitimate child who had been born in 1930. Al-
though the defendant had supported his child until one year before the
action, no proceedings had ever been instituted to establish the paternity
of the child. It was held that the action was barred as not brought
within three years from the date of birth of the child or within three
years since the reputed father had acknowledged the paternity of the
child by support given within the three-year period.7 However, in
referring to the amended section the court made this statement: "This
Section, however, was definitely changed by Section 3 of Ch. 217, Pub.
Laws of 1939, which limited the application thereof to proceedings 'to
establish the paternity of such child' and added the proviso thereto,"
From this statement it would appear that as a result of the amendment,
only the civil proceedings were thought by the court to be under the
three-year limitation, and that the criminal action could now be brought
at- any time until the child was fourteen years old if proceedings to
establish the paternity of the child had been instituted within the periods
provided in this section of the Act.
The decision in State v. Dill dispelled this idea so the only effect of
the amendment was to add an extra three years on to the time permis-
sible for bringing the action, and only then if paternity was acknowl-
edged at the end of three years next after birth of the child.
JoHN F. SHuFoD.
Bailments-Negligence-Butden of Proof in Case of
Loss or Damage
The plaintiff's car was 'destroyed by fire while in the possession of
the defendant bailee for repairs. The fire originated in a bowling alley
on the floor above the defendant's garage and spread to the defendant's
premises despite the efforts of the city fire department. The plaintiff
brought this suit for damages based on the defendant's failure to return
the automobile. The record showed that the defendant had not em-
ployed a night watchman, and the court assumed that the defendant
' State v. Killian, 217 N. C. 339,.7 S. E. (2d) 702 (1940).
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had neither a sprinkler system nor fire extinguishers since the record
was silent as to these facts. The defendant contended that the loss was
due to a force beyond his control. At the clgse of the testimony in the
trial court the defendant moved for a 'directed verdict on the ground
that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was
that the defendant was not guilty of any negligence having a causal
connection with the destruction of the plaintiff's property. The trial
judge overruled the motion and sent the case to the jury who returned
a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, one
judge dissenting, reversed the trial court and directed a verdict for the
defendant on the theory that the record of the case did not warrant a
reasonable inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. The
dissenting judge argued that the case should have gone to the jury for
its determination of the defendant's negligence on all the facts of the
case.
1
Bailments are now generally classified under three types: (1) Those
for the sole benefit of the bailor; (2) those for the sole benefit of the
bailee; and (3) those for the benefit of both parties. The latter type
arises where one person gives to another the temporary use and pos-
session of his property, other than money, for reward, the latter person
agreeing to return the property at a future time. A bailment for mutual
benefit connotes lucrative benefit for both parties.2  Generally the de-
grees of negligence have been done away with by most courts, and the
degree of care required of any bailee is that care which would be exer-
cised by a person of ordinary prudence under the same circumstances
in regard to his own property.3 A bailee for mutual benefit is held not
to be an insurer.4
The instant case is one involving a bailment for mutual benefit. The
particular problem presented is that of the quantum of evidence re-
quired of the bailor to establish his case against the bailee for his failure
to return the bailed.goods, and the quantum required of the bailee to
maintain an adequate defense to the bailor's suit. The question of the
burden of proof, and the allied problem of the burden of going forward
with the evidence, has caused the courts much concern. It is generally
held in such cases that proof b7 the bailor of the 'delivery of the goods
to the bailee and the latter's failure to return the bailed goods on demand
'Kelley v. Capital Motors, Inc., - S. C. -, 28 S. E. (2d) 836 (1944).
'Godfrey v. City of Flint, 284 Mich. 291, 279 N. W. 516 (1938); Hanes v.
Shapiro, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33 (1915).
* Livaudais v. Lee She Tung, 197 La. 844, 2 So. (2d) 232 (1941); Peet v.
Roth Hotel Co., 191 Minn. 151, 253 N. W. 546 (1934) ; Trustees of Elon College
v. Elon Banking and Trust Co., 182 N. C. 298, 109 S. E. 6 (1921).
'Travelers Fire Insurance Co. v. Brock & Co., 30 Cal. App. (2d) 115, 85 P.
(2d) 904 (1938) ; Dennis v. Coleman's Parking and Greasing Stations, Inc., 211
Minn. 597, 2 N. W. (2d) 33 (1942); Arnold v. Kensington Plaza Garages, Inc.,
179 Misc. 697, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 118 (1943).
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free from damage is prima facie evidence that the loss or damage was
due to the negligence of the bailee. 5 Allowing the plaintiff a prima
jacie case prevents the imposition of an undue hardship on him who
otherwise would be forced at the outset of the trial to prove facts of
which he had no knowledge-facts in the exclusive possession of the
bailee.
Some courts, following the English rule,6* have held that the burden
of proof at all times lies on the plaintiff, not only to show loss and in-
jury but also negligence directly attributable to the defendant.7* How-
ever, "the rule adopted in the more modem decisions is that the proof
of loss or injury establishes a sufficient prima facie case against the
bailee to put him upon his defense. Where chattels are delivered to a
bailee in good condition and are returned in a damaged state, or lost
or not returned at all, the law presumes negligence to be the cause,
and casts upon the bailee the burden of showing that the loss is due to
other causes consistent with due care on his part." North Carolina
follows the modem rule in allowing the plaintiff thus to establish a
prima facie case of negligence. 9*
Some states have made distinctions in the prima facie theory on the
basis of the pleadings. The bailor has his choice of actions against the
See notes 8 and 9 post.
G*STORY, COmmENTARIES ON TnE LAW OF BAILMENTS (5th ed. 1851) §454
states this rule as follows: "In respect to depositories for hire, there seem to be
some discrepancies in the authorities, whether the onus probandi of negligence
lies on the plaintiff, or the exculpation of negligence lies on the defendant, in a
suit brought for the loss. In England the former rule is maintained. In America,
an inclination of opinion has sometimes been expressed the other way; yet per-
haps the weight of authority coincides with the English rule.... By the French
law, where a loss or injury happens to the thing deposited for hire, the burden
of proof is in like manner thrown on the hirer to repel the presumption."
l* Poydras Fruit Co. v. Weinberger Banana Co., 189 La. 940, 181 So. 452 (1938);
Sandier v. Commonwealth Station Co., 307 Mass. 470, 473, 30 N. E. (2d) 389, 391
(1940) where the court said, "The burden of proving negligence of the defendant
was on the plaintiff and there was no presumption that the defendant as a bailee
did not use due care in safeguarding the plaintiff's automobile."; Yeo v. Miller
North Broad Storage Co., 146 Pa. Super. 408, 23 A. (2d) 79 (1941) ; Schell v.
Miller North Broad Storage Co., Inc., 142 Pa. Super. 293, 16 A. (2d) 680 (1940) ;
Farrell-Calhoun Co. v. Union Chevrolet Co., 21 Tenn. App. 554, 113 S. W. (2d)
419 (1937); Magoon v. Motors Acceptance Corp., 238 Wisc. 1, 298 N. W. 191
(1941).
1 State v. Clark, 2 Terry 246, 20 A. (2d) 127 (Sup. Ct., Del. 1941) ; Quinn v.
Miler, 34 A. (2d) 259 (Mun. Ct. of App., D. C. 1943); Carscallen v. Lakeside
Highway Dist., 44 Idaho 724, 260 Pac. 162 (1927); Brenton v. Sloan's United
Storage and Van Co., 315 Ill. App. 278, 42 N. E. (2d) 945 (1942) ; Berkowitz v.
Pierce, 129 N. J. L. 299, 29 A. (2d) 552 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Castorina v. Rosen,
290 N. Y. 445, 49 N. E. (2d) 521 (1943) ; Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co., 179 N. C.
231, 232, 101 S. E. 313, 314 (1920) ; Hansen v. Oregon-Washington R. and Nay.
Co., 92 Ore. 190, 188 Pac. 963 (1920).
'*The leading case on this point is Hanes v. Shapiro, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E.
33 (1915), where the plaintiff sent a sideboard to the vendor of the article for
repairs, and the bailed goods were destroyed by fire; Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co.,
179 N. C. 231, 102 S. E. 313 (1920); Falls v. Goforth, 216 N. C. 501, 5 S. E.(2d) 554 (1939) ; Swain v. Twin City Motor Co., Inc., 207 N. C. 755, 178 S. E.
560 (1935); Hutchins v. Taylor-Buick Co., 198 N. C. 777, 153 S. E. 397 (1930).
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bailee: (1) he may allege trover for failure of the bailee to return the
bailed goods in which case he has to prove conversion; (2) he may
bring a tort action for negligence; or (3) he may bring an action on
the contract and the breach thereof.10 Some states will allow the prima
facie case on some pleadings while refusing it on others."* However,
there are states that concede the different types of actions and yet allow
.the plaintiff a prima facie case whether he alleges one of the types or
combines them.12* North Carolina apparently makes no issue of the
distinctions in pleadings. The leading case of Hanes v. Shapiro13 was
brought on the breach of the bailment contract, and other cases have
been pleaded on the tort basis' 4 or a combination of the contract and
tort.15 South Carolina seems to follow North Carolina, since the prima
facie case has been permitted in actions based on the contract'0 and on
the tort.
17
The plaintiff having presented a prima facie case, the burden then
devolves on the defendant to prove ordinary care on his part sufficient
to rebut the prima facie case, and when this is adequately done, the
burden once more is cast upon the plaintiff to prove his case or fail.
Despite the confused terminology used by the courts, the burden cast
is that of going forward with the evidence to prove a given proposition;
10 Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, 132 P. (2d) 680 (Sup. Ct., Utah 1943).
"* U Drive & Tour, Ltd. v. System Auto Parks, Ltd., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 782,
71 P. (2d) 354, 356 (1937) states the holding of the California courts thus: "The
complaint contains sufficient allegations to state a cause of action for conversion
of plaintiff's automobile by defendant, a bailee thereof. Where such a cause of
action is stated, the plaintiff makes a sufficient prima facie showing by proof of
the bailment and subsequent refusal of the defendant on demand to make delivery
according to the contract, and this casts on the defendant the burden of explaining
his refusal . . . if plaintiff alleges a loss by fire or theft, and charges this was
due to defendant's negligence, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove such negli-
gence.... So it seems that the answer to the question, on whom is the burden
of proof as to the defendant's negligence, depends upon the pleadings."; Note
(1940) 14 TEMP. L. Q. 261.
" *Lewis v. Ebersole, 12 So. (2d) 543 (Sup. Ct., Ala. 1943) where the action
was brought on both the contract and negligence; Zanker v. Cedar Flying Service,
214 Minn. 242, 7 N. W. (2d) 775 (1943) in which the plaintiff pleaded the bail-
ment contract and negligence; Wexler v. National Ben Franklin Insurance Co.,
156 Misc. 755, 281 N. Y. Supp. 949 (1935) where the plaintiff pleaded both con-
tract and tort actions; Romney v. Covey Garage, 100 Utah 167, 172, 111 P. (2d)
545, 547 (1941) in which the court stated, "This holding . . . brings the ex-
contractu action for breach of the contract of bailment because of loss or damage,
in line with the action for negligence for such loss or damage. There is no real
reason why the form of action should materially change the remedy or fasten on
the plaintiff a greater burden in one case than in the other."10168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33 (1915).
' Swain v. Twin City Motor Co., Inc., 207 N. C. 755, 178 S. E. 560 (1935);
Hutchins v. Taylor-Buick Co., 198 N. C. 777, 153 S. E. 397 (1930).20Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co., 179 N. C. 231, 102 S. E. 313 (1920).
" Gilland v. Peter's Dry Cleaning Co., Inc., 195 S. C. 417, 11 S. E. (2d) 857
(1940).17 Albergotti v. Dixie Produce Co., Inc., 202 S. C. 357, 25 S. E. (2d) 156
(1943); Fleischman, Morris & Co. v. Southern Railway, 76 S. C. 237, 56 S. E.
974 (1907).
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for the burden of proof in the accurate sense never shifts but remains
on the plaintiff throughout the proceeding.18
Just what it takes to refute the plaintiff's prima facie case or the
presumption of negligence has led to much divergence of opinion in the
courts. One line of authority holds that "defendant's duty is prima
facie discharged in this respect when the loss is shown to have occurred
as the result of fire or theft, thereby requiring plaintiff to prove that the
fire or theft was the result of the defendant's negligence."' 0  But there
is a growing body of sentiment to the effect that the burden still re-
mains on the defendant to show further that his actions were consistent
with due care. The prima facie case of the bailor is not overcome by
a showing on the part of the bailee that the goods have been burned or
otherwise destroyed. Before such a prima facie case can be said to be
overcome, the bailee must further prove that the loss, damage or theft
was occasioned without his fault. This rule has been applied to garage
'keepers who failed to return automobiles on demand.20  The reasoning
behind this viewpoint is that thus the defendant is prevented from
merely offering, as a defense, force -beyond his control with no further
explanation, leaving the plaintiff with the hardihood of presenting his
claim. The defendant, having possession of the bailed goods and knowl-
edge of the facts surrounding the bailment, is in a superior position to
explain the loss. This latter view is the more modern one and is find-
ing support in many states, 21 * but whether it is yet the weight of author-
"- Wolf v. Pedian, 251 Ill. App. 564 (1929); Hansen v. Oregon-Washington
R. and Nav. Co., 92 Ore. 190, 188 Pac. 963 (1920).
"Lewis v. Ebersole, 12 So. (2d) 543, 547 (Sup. Ct., Ala. 1943) ; Scott v.
Columbia Compress Co., 157 Ark. 521, 249 S. W. 13 (1923) ; Carscallen v. Lake-
side Highway Dist., 44 Idaho 724, 260 Pac. 162 (1927); Rochette v. Terminal R.
Ass'n of St. Louis, 225 S. W. 1019 (St. Louis Ct. of App., Mo. 1920) ; Castorina
v. Rosen, 290 N. Y. 445, 49 N. E. (2d) 521 (1943) ; Hansen v. Oregon-Washington
R. and Nay. Co., 92 Ore. 190, 188 Pac. 963 (1920); Farrel-Calhoun Co. v. Union
Chevrolet Co., 21 Tenn. App. 554, 113 S. W. (2d) 419 (1937).
20 Keenan -Hotel Co. v. Funk, 73 Ind. App. 677, 177 N. E. 364 (1931).2
* U Drive & Tour, Ltd. v. System Auto Parks, Ltd., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 782,
71 P. (2d) 354, 356 (1937) where the court stated, "But it now seems settled that
where the plaintiff's action is strictly one of conversion, or upon the contract for
failure to redeliver the property, the defendant must justify his failure, and if he
relies upon the proposition that the property was lost by theft or fire without
negligence on his part, the burden is on him to prove these facts, including his
lack of negligence in order to rebut the prima facie case of the plaintiff."; State
v. Clark, 2 Terry 246, 20 A. (2d) 127 (Sup. Ct., Del. 1941) was a case involving
machinery stolen from a sheriff who had levied on the property. The situation
was held to be like that of a bailment for hire. It was said that when there was
proof of loss or damage or theft, it was the duty of the sheriff to go forward
with proof to show proper care in keeping the property.; Quin v. Miller, 34 A.
(2d) 259 (Mun. Ct. of App., D. C. 1943) ; Brenton v. Sloan's United Storage
and Van Co., 315 Ill. App. 278, 282, 42 N. E. (2d) 945, 947 (1942) where the
court said: "Under the law of this state a bailor makes a prina facie case as
against a bailee by showing that the goods which have been bailed have not been
returned upon demand, and such prima facie case is not overcome by a mere
showing to the effect that the goods have been burned or otherwise destroyed. To
discharge himself from liability under such circumstances a bailee must show that
[Vol. 22
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ity is questionable. North Carolina in the Hanes Case said that the
showing of loss by fire was sufficient to rebut the prima facie case of
the plaintiff. However, in the case of Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co.,22
followed by others,23 the court decreed that the defendant must come
forth with an affirmative showing of his due care in addition to proving
force beyond his control.
The probative force of the evidence in the various stages of the
proceedings presents a complex problem. If the plaintiff establishes
his prima facie case, and the defendant fails to meet this at all, the ver-
dict may then be directed for the plaintiff.24 North Carolina is contra
to this general holding in that the verdict can never be directed for the
plaintiff who has the burden of proof, but the question must be sent to
the jury.25  In other jurisdictions if the defendant comes forward with
evidence showing the cause of the loss or damage to have been beyond
his control, the burden then is thrust back upon the plaintiff to prove
specific negligence or the verdict will be directed for the defendant 2 6
However, in those cases which impose on the defendant not only the
duty'of showing failure to redeliver the goods because of force beyond
the loss occurred without his fault and whether he has met this burden is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to decide."
Zanker v. Cedar Flying Service, 214 Minn. 242, 7 N. W. (2d) 775 (1943);
Evans v. Coleman's Parking and Greasing Stations, 211 Minn. 597, 2 N. W. (2d)
33 (1942); Berkowitz v. Pierce, 129 N. J. L. 299, 29 A. (2d) 552 (Sup. Ct.
1943); Wexler v. National Ben Franklin Insurance Co., 156 Misc. 755, 281 N. Y.
Supp. 949 (1935) in which the court says that certain statements in other New
York cases might lead to the conclusion that mere proof of a fire or theft would
destroy the bailor's prima facie case and place on him the burden of proving negli-
gence, but that an examination of those cases would show that in each the sur-
rounding circumstances were proved and some explanation of the loss given; Fed-
eral Insurance Co. v. Lindsley, 132 Misc. 54, 228 N. Y. Supp. 614 (1928) ; Eng-
lish v. Traders' Compress Co., 167 Okla. 580, 31 P. (2d) 588 (1934); Huie v.
Lay, 170 S. W' (2d) 823 (Ct. of Civ. App., Tex. 1943).
The Louisiana court has not gone as far as many courts in placing on the
defendant the burden of proving due care after he has proved destruction or loss
of the bailed goods by force beyond his control. Instead they have placed this
burden on the defendant only in those cases where the fire originated on the
premises of the defendant and consumed only the bailed goods of the plaintiff as
in Gulf Insurance Co. v. Temple, 187 So. 814 (Ct. of App., La. 1939) and in
Royal Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Collard Motors, 179 So. 108 (Ct. of, App., La. 1938).
22 179 N. C. 231, 102 S. E. 313 (1920).
.- Falls v. Goforth, 216 N. C. 501, 5 S. E. (2d) 554 (1939) ; Swain v. Twin
City Motor Co., 207 N. C. 755, 178 S. E. 560 (1935) ; Hutchins v. Taylor-Buick
Co., 198 N. C. 777, 153 S. E. 397 (1930).
" Quinn v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 34 A. (2d) 259 (Mun. Ct. of App. D. C.
1943) ; 9 WIGMORE, EvmENcE (3rd ed. 1940) §2494.
"' Star Manufacturing Co. v. Atlantic Coastline R., 222 N. C. 330, 23 S. E.
(2d) 32 (1942) ; Eller v. Church, 121 N. C. 269, 28 S. E. 364 (1897). Oklahoma
agrees with North Carolina in English v. Traders' Compress Co., 167 Okla. 580,
31 P. (2d) 588 (1934).
211 Carscallen v. Lakeside Highway Dist., 44 Idaho 724, 260 Pac. 162 (1927);
Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Fisher, 291 Ill. App. 495, 10 N. E. (2d) 220 (1937);
9 Wmmoaz, EvmE cE (3rd ed. 1940) §2494.
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his control but also the duty of affirmatively establishing due care,
whether or not he has met this burden is a question for the jury.2 7
North Carolina is in accord in allowing these cases *to go to the jury.28
There is one exception to this rule. That is, when the defendant
has come forward and shown that the damage resulted from forces be-
yond his control and has affirmatively established due care, and there
remains but one inference that can be reasonably drawn from the facts,
the question of due care belongs to the court and not to the jury.20 This
type of case is predicated upon particular and unusual fact situations.80 *
A Kentucky case3 1 presents a clear example of the applicability of
the "one inference" situation. The plaintiff's potatoes were destroyed
by flood waters infiltrating a cold storage warehouse. The defendant
had been warned of the approaching flood and started taking precau-
tions by removing the goods stored in the basement. On the authority
of the United States Weather Bureau that the water would not rise to
such a height as would cause flooding of the basement, and on the basis
of previous yearly records of the flood rise, the defendant ceased re-
moval of the goods. The court held that the defendant would not over-
come the prima facie case of the plaintiff merely by showing that the
property was destroyed by an act of God, but that he must show rea-
sonable precautions to forestall it. The precautionary removal of the
goods and the later reliance on the Weather Bureau information was
held to justify the only reasonable inference that the defendant has
acted as an ordinary intelligent man would have acted under the same
"
7Brenton v. Sloan's United Storage and Van Co., 315 Ill. App. 278, 42 N. E.
(2d) 945 (1942) ; Zanker v. Cedar Flying Service, 214 Minn. 242, 7 N. W. (2d)
775 (1943) ; Evans v. Coleman's Parking and Greasing Stations, 211 Minn. 597, 2
N. W. (2d) 33 (1942); Romney v. Covey Garage, 100 Utah 167, 111 P. (2d)
545 (1941).2s Hutchins v. Taylor-Buick Co., 198 N. C. 777, 153 S. E. 397 (1930); Trus-
tees of Elon College v. Elon Banking and Trust Co., 182 N. C. 298, 109 S. E. 6(1921) ; Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co., 179 N. C. 231, 102 S. E. 313 (1920).
SHoman v. Burkhart, 108 Cal. App. 363, 291 Pac. 624 (1930); Merchants
Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. United Produce Co., 279 Ky. 519, 131 S. W. (2d)
469 (1939) ; Dufresne v. Dick, 51 R. I. 135, 152 At. 692 (1930).30
* North Carolina has one case where the "one inference" rule was applied.
In Swain v. Twin City Motor Co., 207 N. C. 755, 758, 178 S. E. 560, 561 (1935) the
plaintiff's car -was stolen while in a garage. The defendant proved the theft, the
car being parked within the garage while many attendants were about; that leav-
ing keys in the car was customary and incidental to the service; and that patrons
frequently came into the garage and the presence of the thief had thus excited
no suspicion among the employees. The court said, "But suppose, it should
appear from the -plaintiff's evidence, or if the fact was uncontroverted, that while
in such garage, the car was struck by lightning or the employees of the garage
were held up by an armed highwayman and the car was taken from the custody
of the bailee, who was otherwise exercising ordinary care, it would hardly be
supposed that under such circumstances the law requires the solemn formality of
submitting issues upon such admitted facts."
" Merchants Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. United Produce Co., 279 Ky. 519,
131 S. W. (2d) 469 (1939).
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circumstances, and the question of the defendant's ordinary care was
decided as one of law.
The majority held the instant case to be of this exceptional "one
inference" type. South Carolina follows the prima facie theory,32 and
imposes on the bailee the duty of showing not only the loss -due to force
beyond his control, but also due care to prevent loss or injury.3 3 The
question of whether due care has been exercised is generally one for the
jury.3 4 The majority view was predicated upon the case of Albergotti
v. Dixie Produce Ca.35 which stated the "one inference" rule but was
not itself an example of such a case since the court there left the ques-
tion of due care to the jury.
Was the instant case capable of only one interpretation from the
facts-the interpretation that the defendant had exercised due care and
done all that a reasonable man in like circumstances could be expected
to do?
The majority of the court seemed to think that from the defendant's
evidence only one inference could be drawn. The plaintiff insisted that
failure to provide a night watchman, sprinkler system or fire extin-
guishers showed a lack of due care on the part of the defendant. But
the majority dismissed this contention by saying that if the defendant
was held by law to the highest degree of care, these precautions would
be necessary, whereas in a bailment for mutual benefit only ordinary
care is required. The court stated: "We hesitate to hold that every
person who operates an automobile sales room and repair garage must
either employ a night watchman or else be guilty of negligence-or
must either install a sprinkler system or fire extinguishing apparatus
or else be held to be negligent-or must either have all three-night
watchman, sprinkler system and fire extinguishing apparatus-or else
be held to be negligent."3 6
It is admitted that a bailee for mutual benefit should not be required
to exercise more than ordinary care. Nor should he be responsible for
losses arising from fire or theft which occur without any fault on his
part. However, the bailee undertakes that the place of bailment should
be reasonably safe, fit for its various purposes, and free from any de-
fects which could have been discovered by the use of ordinary care.
2 Gilland v. Peter's Dry Cleaning Co., 195 S. C. 417, 11 S. t. (2d) 857
(1940); Fleischman, Morris & Co.'v. Southern Railway, 76 S. C. 237, 56 S. E.
974 (1907).
" Albergotti v. Dixie Produce Co., Inc., 202 S. C. 357, 25 S. E. (2d) 156
(1943); Gilland v. Peter's Dry Cleaning Co., 195 S. C. 417, 11 S. E. (2d) 857
(1940); Fleischman, Morris & Co. v. Southern Railway, 76 S. C. 237, 56 S. E.
974 (1907).
,Ibid.
"202 S. C. 357, 25 S. E. (2d) 156 (1943).
"Kelley v. Capital Motors, - S. C. -, 28 S. E. (2d) 836, 839 (1944).
19441
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"It should be equipped with modern appliances and improvements in
general use by this class of custodians for the protection of goods against
injury by theft, fire, rats, heat and other destroying agents." 37
The majority opinion ruled as a matter of law that these precaution-
ary measures were not incidental to due care, thus disregarding the
requirements of the times with reference to the usages and customs of
the particular bailee's trade, and also the nature and value of the bailed
goods and its liability to damage. These factors should have been left
to the discretion of the jury for determination of the defendant's exer-
cise of due care, and in ruling on this as a matter of law, the South
Carolina Supreme Court seems to be in error.
IDRIENNE E. LEVY.
GODDARD, OUTLINES OF LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (2d. ed. 1928)§153.
